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A major feat of social beings is to encode what their conspecifics see, know or 30 
believe. While various nonhuman animals show precursors of these abilities, 31 
humans perform uniquely sophisticated inferences about other people’s 32 
mental states. However, it is still unclear how these possibly human-specific 33 
capacities develop and whether preverbal infants, similarly to adults form 34 
representations of other agents’ mental states, specifically 35 
metarepresentations. We explored the neuro-cognitive bases of 8-month-olds’ 36 
ability to encode the world from another person’s perspective, using gamma-37 
band EEG activity over the temporal lobes, an established neural signature for 38 
sustained object representation after occlusion. We observed such gamma-39 
band activity when an object was occluded from the infants’ perspective, as 40 
well as when it was occluded only from the other person (Experiment 1), and 41 
also when subsequently the object disappeared but the person falsely 42 
believed the object to be present (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that 43 
the cognitive systems involved in representing the world from infants’ own 44 
perspective are also recruited for encoding others’ beliefs. Such results point 45 
to an early developing, powerful apparatus suitable to deal with multiple 46 
concurrent representations; and suggest that infants can have a 47 





Humans and other animals encode various aspects of the world, 52 
allowing them to successfully navigate their physical and social environment. 53 
What possibly sets humans apart from other species is that they attribute 54 
mental states to other people as representations of the environment that may 55 
be different from their own representations. This ability is usually termed as 56 
Theory of Mind and includes reasoning about others’ mental states such as 57 
beliefs, goals, or desires (1). Theory of Mind capacities seem to emerge early 58 
in human development, as a growing body of evidence suggests that infants 59 
can interpret others’ behaviour with regard to their mental states very early on 60 
(2, 3), although the underlying mechanisms are still unclear. 61 
 62 
Already in their first year of life infants can predict others’ actions based 63 
on their mental states (4), and at around 18 months of age they can also 64 
modify their own behaviour accordingly (5, 6, 7). Such findings were taken as 65 
evidence that infants attribute beliefs to others and represent these belief 66 
contents in the form of metarepresentations (i.e., representations 67 
incorporating other representations) (8). Other accounts, however, question 68 
the validity of the interpretation of these studies in terms of mental state 69 
attributions, and suggest that instead of ascribing mental representations to 70 
others, infants simply store object-agent relations (9), form associations, or 71 
apply behavioural rules (10). Similar alternatives were also raised with regard 72 
to nonhuman animals’ Theory of Mind abilities (11). Metarepresentations in 73 
general, and Theory of Mind or false belief understanding in particular, have 74 
been argued to be absent in other species than humans (12, 13, 14). Thus, to 75 
understand the nature and origins of such abilities it would be crucial to 76 
4 
assess whether pre-linguistic creatures, specifically human infants attribute 77 
representations to other people. 78 
 79 
Different accounts emerged regarding how humans may deal with 80 
metarepresentations used in language and in mental state reasoning. Sperber 81 
(13) proposed that the most cost-effective way for a cognitive system to 82 
handle them would be if any representation could also serve as a 83 
metarepresentation. Leslie (8), in his work describing a cognitive model of 84 
pretense (make-believe play observed in toddlers, such as pretending that a 85 
banana is a telephone) argues that in pretense the primary representation of 86 
an object is copied into a ‘metarepresentational context.’ Both of these 87 
proposals involve some form of ‘re-use’ of a primary representation. The 88 
relation between a linguistic utterance as a primary representation (e.g. ‘Dogs 89 
can fly’) and a corresponding metarepresentation (e.g. ‘It is unlikely that dogs 90 
can fly’) may seem intuitive. However, it is unclear how such embedded 91 
representations are implemented in the cognitive architecture, how they are 92 
realized in case of non-linguistic representations, and whether the underlying 93 
mechanism could be already present in preverbal infants. 94 
 95 
Earlier research from the domain of action understanding might provide 96 
useful insights regarding how the developing cognitive system may deal with 97 
representations that regard other people. Specifically, recent 98 
electrophysiological findings suggest that infants recruit their motor system 99 
(as reflected by decreased sensorimotor alpha-band oscillatory activation) not 100 
only when they perform an action but also during the observation and 101 
prediction of others’ actions (14). In the domain of Theory of Mind, 102 
5 
behavioural evidence seems to point to an analogous possibility. When 103 
infants or adults are exposed to situations where they can track others’ 104 
perspective or beliefs, their own representations and the representations 105 
attributed to others seem to influence their reactions in analogous ways (3, 106 
15). For example, infants show surprise when the outcome of an event does 107 
not match another agent’s belief about the scene, similarly to their surprise if 108 
the outcome contradicts their own knowledge (3). These findings suggest that 109 
the two representations may overlap, and are in line with the proposal that a 110 
possible mechanism for infants (or adults) to attribute representations to 111 
others would utilize their own representational system that is otherwise used 112 
for encoding objects and events in the world.  113 
 114 
In the present study we build on this proposal: if infants ascribe a 115 
representation to another person, say, about an object, they would rely on 116 
their original representation, which would then be used as the content of the 117 
mental state. This way infants’ own representations of the environment and 118 
the representations ascribed to others could be realized through one cognitive 119 
system subserving both processes. If so, this enables us to make predictions 120 
about the neural signatures of processing ascribed representations. For 121 
example, if maintaining a representation of an object, as a primary 122 
representation, has a specific neural correlate in infants, we should observe a 123 
similar neural activation also if infants process an object representation they 124 
attribute to another person. To test these questions, we exploit earlier 125 
paradigms that found a specific brain signature accompanying object 126 
representations in infants.  127 
 128 
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Infants possess powerful representational abilities to sustain the 129 
representation of an object even if it is not visible to them anymore. Kaufman 130 
and colleagues (16) found increased gamma-band oscillatory activation in 131 
electroencephalographic (EEG) responses over the temporal regions when 6-132 
month-old infants witnessed the occlusion of an object, compared to when the 133 
object disintegrated before occlusion. Similar activation was found when a 134 
hand grasped an occluder behind which an object had previously disappeared 135 
(17). Together, these findings suggest that the gamma-band activation 136 
signalled that infants actively sustained the representation of the object, which 137 
they believed to be behind the occluder. Here we hypothesize that such 138 
activation may not only reflect processes involved in how infants handle object 139 
representations for themselves, but also signal computations required for 140 
attributing a representation about an object to another person.  141 
 142 
In two studies we presented 8-month-old infants with scenes involving 143 
an actor and an object, and recorded event-related EEG activity during events 144 
involving the occlusion of the object from the infants’ or the actor's 145 
perspective. An increase in gamma-band activation was predicted when either 146 
the infant, or the actor had to sustain the representation of the object.  147 
 148 
Study 1 149 
 150 
Study 1 explored 8-month-old infants’ understanding of a scene where 151 
a person is attending to an object, which is then occluded from her. We asked 152 
whether this event triggers an attribution process that involves sustained 153 
object representations. In order to test this, we developed scenarios involving 154 
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occlusion events from multiple perspectives (see Figure 1). First, a target 155 
object and an actor were shown on the screen, with the object visible to both 156 
the infant and the actor. Then the object was occluded either from only the 157 
actor or also from the infant’s view. In order to implement a dynamically 158 
changing visual access to the object from multiple viewpoints, we placed the 159 
object in a box that that had two sides removed. By rotating the box either the 160 
infant, the actor on the screen, neither, or both could see the object in 161 
question. We compared these events to scenarios where the box initially 162 
contained an object, but then the object disintegrated while both the actor and 163 
the infants could see this event. Therefore the motion of the box was identical 164 
in the two kinds of events, but in this latter case the box did not occlude an 165 
object from the actor’s or infant’s view, but rather just empty space. 166 
 167 
On basis of previous findings (16, 17), we predicted increased gamma-168 
band activation during the occlusion of the object from the infants’ view. 169 
Furthermore, we hypothesized shared underlying mechanisms for sustaining 170 
an object representation for the self and for another person. Therefore an 171 
increased gamma-band oscillatory activity during Occlusion from Actor would 172 
suggest that infants encode that the actor sustains the representation of the 173 
object while it is occluded from her. We calculated the average EEG gamma-174 
band activation (25-35 Hz) over the left and right posterior temporal regions 175 
specified by earlier studies targeting sustained object representations in 176 





Materials and Methods 181 
 182 
Participants. The final sample consisted of 15 full-term 8-month-old infants 183 
(mean age = 246.3 d; age range 236-255 d).  184 
 185 
Stimuli. Two types of videos were used (corresponding to the two conditions). 186 
Both featured a female actor who looked at a rotating box open at two sides 187 
that contained an object. First, the opening of the box was facing away for 200 188 
ms, then it rotated to reveal the object in 600 ms, and stood still for 200 ms. 189 
Then the Actor turned to the object for 600 ms. This was followed by the 190 
object remaining present (Object Present – Occlusion condition, video S1) or 191 
the object disintegrating in 600 ms (Object Absent – Occlusion condition, 192 
video S2). Following a 300-500 ms (randomized length) still period, the box 193 
turned further, occluding the object (Object Present – Occlusion condition) or 194 
an empty area (Object Absent – Occlusion condition) from the Actor in 600 195 
ms. After a 700-900 ms (randomized length) still period, the box rotated again 196 
further and occluded the object (Object Present – Occlusion condition) or an 197 
empty area (Object Absent – Occlusion condition) from the Infant as well. The 198 
trial ended with an 800 ms still period with the box completely turned away 199 
(identical in the two conditions). For further details regarding stimuli and 200 
procedure see SI Materials and Methods. 201 
 202 
EEG recording and analysis. Continuous EEG was recorded using Hydrocel 203 
Geodesic Sensor Nets (Electrical Geodesics Inc., Eugene, OR, USA) from 204 
124 channels equally distributed on the scalp, referenced to the vertex (Cz). 205 
The ground electrode was at the rear of the head (between Cz and Pz). The 206 
9 
sampling rate was 500 Hz with a low-pass filter of 200 Hz. The EEG was 207 
segmented into two types of segments of interest.  208 
 209 
The first segment (Occlusion from Actor) was the part of the video 210 
when, in the Object Present condition, the object was gradually hidden from 211 
the actor due to the rotation of the box, while the infants still saw it. In the 212 
Object Absent condition this segment included the identical movement of the 213 
empty box. This segment was time-locked to the start of the movement of the 214 
box, and lasted 1200 ms after rotation onset, of which the rotation took place 215 
in the first 600 ms. The baseline period for the Occlusion from Actor segment 216 
was the 200 ms recording preceding the rotation of the occluder.  The second 217 
segment of interest (Occlusion from Infant) corresponded to the period when 218 
the object became gradually hidden from the infants. This segment was time-219 
locked to the start of the respective movement of the occluder and had a 220 
length of 1200 ms. In the Occlusion from Infant segment we used an epoch 221 
that roughly matched (due a jittered period after the Occlusion from Actor 222 
segment) the baseline period in the first segment: a 200-ms-long interval 223 
ending 1500 ms before the onset of Occlusion from Infant (for calculating this 224 
baseline period see SI Materials and Methods). 225 
 226 
The EEG data were examined and segments were excluded if they 227 
were judged as not attended by the infant based on the video recording, or 228 
contained artefacts as judged by the automatic or manual artefact detection 229 
(for further details see SI Materials and Methods). After the time-frequency 230 
transformation performed on the cleaned data, we compared oscillatory 231 
activity between the two conditions over 5-5 channels in right (channels 97, 232 
10 
98, 102, 103, 109, positioned above channel T3 in the 10-20 system) and left 233 
(channels 40, 41, 46, 47, 51, above channel T4 in the 10-20 system) temporal 234 
areas. Electrode sites were selected based on previous work by Kaufman and 235 
colleagues (16, 17). We analysed the lower frequencies (25-35 Hz) of the 236 
gamma range, where activation was the most pronounced in earlier studies, 237 
(17) for our events of interest. 238 
 239 





First we analysed gamma-band oscillatory activation in the two 245 
segments separately, in two-way ANOVAs with Condition (Object Present - 246 
Occlusion vs. Object Absent - Occlusion) and Hemisphere (Left vs. Right) as 247 
within-subjects factors. To assess whether our results replicate earlier findings 248 
on neural signatures of sustained object representations, we analysed 249 
activation during the Occlusion from Infant segment (Segment 2). Analysis 250 
revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F(1,14) = 13.23, p = .003, 251 
partial η2 = .49, due to significantly higher activation in the Occlusion (M= 0.09 252 
µV, SE= .03), compared to Object Absent - Occlusion condition (M = -0.07 253 
µV, SE = .04 µV, Figure 2B). There was no main effect of Hemisphere, and 254 
no interaction between Condition and Hemisphere (F(1,14) = 0.04, p = .81; 255 
and F(1,14) = 0.06, p = .86). 256 
 257 
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We conducted a similar two-way ANOVA for the Occlusion from Actor 258 
segment (Segment 1), which revealed a significant interaction between 259 
Condition and Hemisphere (F(1,14) = 4.99, p = .04, partial η2 = .26), and a 260 
marginally significant main effect of Condition (F(1,14) = 4.53, p = .052, partial 261 
η2 = .24). There was no effect of Hemisphere (F(1,14) = 0.06, p = .81). To 262 
understand the interaction, we performed separate t-tests for the two 263 
hemispheres. There was no significant difference between Occlusion and 264 
Control in the right hemisphere, t(14) = -1.03, p = .32. Importantly, there was a 265 
significant difference in the left hemisphere, t(14) = -2.56, p = .023, r2 = .32, 266 
due to higher gamma activation in the Object Present - Occlusion condition (M 267 
= 0.08 µV, SE = 0.05 µV) than in Object Absent - Occlusion condition (M = -268 
0.12 µV, SE = 0.04 µV, see Figure 2A).  269 
 270 
[Figure 2 about here] 271 
 272 
 273 
To assess whether the pattern of activation in the two segments was 274 
similar to each other, we analysed them together in a repeated measure 275 
ANOVA with Segment (Occlusion from Actor vs. Occlusion from Infant), 276 
Condition (Object Present - Occlusion vs. Object Absent - Occlusion) and 277 
Hemisphere (Left vs. Right) as within-subjects factors. We found a significant 278 
main effect of Condition, F(1,14) = 13.24, p = .003, partial η2 = .49. No other 279 
main effect or interaction was significant (for mean values in Study 1, see 280 
Figure 3A). Thus, while in the Occlusion from Actor segment the effect was 281 
more pronounced on the left side, the direction of activation in this segment 282 
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was similar in the two hemispheres and together they did not differ 283 
significantly from that in the Occlusion from Infant segment.  284 
 285 
[Figure 3 about here] 286 
 287 
In addition to analysing activation in our predicted time windows, we 288 
observed a further activation within the same frequency range in the 289 
Occlusion from Actor segment for the 1000-1100 ms period (see Figure 2A). 290 
When we analysed activation this additional time window, we found a 291 
marginally significant effect of Condition in the left hemisphere (t(14)= -2.07, p 292 
= .057, r2 = .23) with higher activation in the Object Present - Occlusion 293 
condition than in the Object Absent - Occlusion condition (M = 0.09 µV, SE = 294 
.05 µV, and M = -0.11 µV, SE = .07 µV, respectively). A similar analysis did 295 
not yield any significant effects in the right hemisphere and in the Occlusion 296 
from Infant segment. While this late activation burst in Occlusion from Actor 297 
segment may signal a possible difference between processing 298 
representations attributed to another agent and first person representations, it 299 




Our results from the Occlusion from Infant segment are in line with 304 
earlier evidence pointing to a signature of infants’ sustained object 305 
representation (16, 17). Specifically, we observed higher gamma-band 306 
activation over posterior temporal areas when an object became occluded 307 
from the infants compared to when there was no object present. Crucially, we 308 
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observed similar activation when the object became occluded from the actor 309 
only (Occlusion from Actor). Note that in the Occlusion from Actor segment 310 
the object was still visible to infants, therefore they did not have to sustain the 311 
object representation from their own perspective. This suggests that infants 312 
attributed a sustained representation of the object to the actor when she lost 313 
visual access to the object. 314 
 315 
These results suggest that 8-month-old infants successfully computed 316 
the visual perspective of the actor regarding the object, an ability that is rarely 317 
observed at such a young age. Furthermore, while visual perspective taking 318 
(computing whether an agent can see an object) is necessary, it may not be 319 
sufficient to explain our findings. Taking the gamma-band oscillatory activity at 320 
the time of occlusion as an indicator of sustained object representation, 321 
infants in our study did not only infer that the person no longer saw the object 322 
(as this would apply in the Object Absent - Occlusion condition as well); they 323 
also attributed to her the representation of the continued existence of the 324 
object behind the occluder.  325 
 326 
Identifying the mechanisms at play when infants attribute a sustained 327 
object representation (a true belief) to another person allows further 328 
investigations of belief attribution processes. If the activation found in Study 1 329 
accompanies events involving attributed object representations, then it should 330 
be present regardless of the veridicality of this representation, i.e., even when 331 
the other person holds a false belief regarding the object’s existence behind 332 
the occluder. 333 
 334 
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Study 2 335 
 336 
We developed a false belief scenario similar to the events in Study 1 337 
(see SI Figure 1). Eight-month-old infants were presented with the same initial 338 
event in which the actor attended to an object. Then in the critical condition 339 
the object became occluded from the person (Segment 1 – identical to 340 
Segment 1 Study 1), and afterwards the object disintegrated (Segment 2). 341 
This disintegration was therefore visible to the infants but not to the actor; 342 
hence this event must have resulted in the actor’s false belief that the object 343 
was still behind the occluder. The critical question was whether infants would 344 
encode that the representation of the object cannot be discarded on behalf of 345 
the actor but it must be further sustained. Such an attribution process might 346 
be indicated by gamma-band activation during the disintegration event that is 347 
seen only by the infant but not the actor. 348 
 349 
 350 
Materials and Methods 351 
 352 
Participants. The final sample consisted of 15 full-term 8-month-old infants 353 
(mean age = 245 d; range = 229-261 d).  354 
 355 
Stimuli. In Study 2, the setting of the scenes and the initial part of the videos 356 
(including the first segment of interest) was identical to Study 1. Then in the 357 
Object occluded – False Belief condition the object was occluded from the 358 
actor by the rotating box in 600 ms (Occlusion from Actor) and after a still 359 
period of 600 ms it disintegrated during 600 ms, while only the infants and not 360 
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the actor could see this event (Video S3). We will refer to this disintegration 361 
period as False Belief event because in this case infants could note that the 362 
object ceased to exist and is not present anymore, and could infer that the 363 
actor should falsely believe it still to be present behind the occluding side of 364 
the box. In the Object Absent – True Belief condition (Video S4) the object 365 
disintegrated when the actor still saw the object, and subsequently the empty 366 
space was occluded in 600 ms. Following a 600 ms still period, (during the 367 
corresponding disintegration period of the Object Occluded – False Belief 368 
condition) in the Object Absent – True Belief condition the empty box 369 
remained turned away from the Actor for 600 ms. Thus, the two conditions 370 
differed only in the timing of the disintegration of the object: after (False Belief) 371 
or before (True Belief) it was occluded from the actor. Finally, in both 372 
conditions the empty box rotated back towards the actor. Hence, infants in 373 
Study 2 never saw the object being occluded from them. The rotation of the 374 
box was identical in the two conditions. For further details regarding stimuli 375 
and procedure see SI Materials and Methods. 376 
 377 
EEG recording and analysis. Except for segmentation, EEG recording and 378 
analysis was identical to that of Study 1. Similarly to Study 1, the first segment 379 
(Occlusion from Actor) was the part of the video when the object was 380 
gradually hidden from the actor by the rotation of the box (in the Object 381 
Occluded – False Belief condition), while the infants still saw it; or the identical 382 
movement of the empty box (in the Object Absent – True Belief Condition). 383 
Hence, in the Occlusion from Actor segment, we specified the same time 384 
window of interest as in Study 1, and the baseline was again a 200-ms-long 385 
epoch finishing 1200 ms before the start of the segment. 386 
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 387 
The second segment of interest (False Belief Event) in Study 2 388 
corresponded to the period when the object disintegrated after being occluded 389 
from the person (or the same time period during the Object Absent – True 390 
Belief Condition) and the subsequent still image. This period lasted 800 ms 391 
and its start was time locked to the start of disintegration event. Similarly to 392 
Study 1, the baseline was a 200-ms-long epoch finishing 1200 ms before the 393 
start of the segment (the same baseline as for Occlusion from Actor). In this 394 
False Belief segment, we analysed activation throughout the disintegration 395 
event, from 1200 to 1800 ms, where 1200 ms corresponded to the onset of 396 
the disintegration and 1800 ms to the time point when the object had fully 397 





We calculated the average gamma-band activation (25-35 Hz) the 403 
same way as in Study 1 during two Segments of interest: Occlusion from 404 
Actor and False Belief.  405 
 406 
As direct comparison between the two segments was not meaningful 407 
(one being an occlusion, which can be seen as a discrete event, while the 408 
other is a disintegration with a gradual temporal unfolding), activations in the 409 
two segments were analysed separately. A two-way ANOVA on the Occlusion 410 
from Actor segment with Condition (Object Occluded – False Belief vs. Object 411 
Absent – True Belief) and Hemisphere (Left vs. Right) as within-subjects 412 
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factors revealed a main effect of Condition (F(1,14) = 5.98, p = .03, partial η2 = 413 
.3). This effect was due to higher activation in the Object Occluded – False 414 
Belief condition (M = 0.044 µV) than in Object Absent – True Belief (M = -0.07 415 
µV, Figure 3B). No other main effect or interaction emerged. 416 
 417 
We then compared activation during Occlusion from Actor in Study 2 to 418 
that of Study 1. These segments were identical in the two studies and both 419 
depicted an Occlusion from Actor event. A three-way mixed ANOVA was 420 
conducted with Condition (Object Present vs. Object Absent) and Hemisphere 421 
(Left vs. Right) as within-subjects factors and Study (1 vs. 2) as a between-422 
subjects factor. This analysis revealed a main effect of Condition (F(1,28) = 423 
10.13, p = .004, partial η2 = .27), which was due to higher activation in the 424 
Object Present condition (M =  0.05 µV, SE = 0.03 µV) than in Object Absent 425 
condition (M = -0.07 µV, SE = 0.02 µV). There was no effect of Study (F(1,14) 426 
= 0.01, p = .92), and no interaction. 427 
 428 
Next we entered the activation during the False Belief segment of 429 
Study 2 in a two-way ANOVA with Condition (Object Occluded – False Belief 430 
vs. Object Absent – True Belief) and Hemisphere (Left vs. Right) as within-431 
subjects factors. There was a significant main effect of Condition, F(1,14) = 432 
8.47, p = .01, partial η2 = .38, due to significantly higher activation in the 433 
Object Occluded – False Belief (M = 0.07 µV, SE = 0.04 µV), compared to 434 
Object Absent – True Belief condition (M = -0.01 µV, SE = 0.05 µV, Figure 4). 435 





[Figure 4 about here] 440 
 441 
 442 
Finally, we analysed the late burst activation in the Occlusion from 443 
Actor segment in the left hemisphere to test whether our findings from Study 1 444 
were replicated. We analysed activation from the two studies with Condition 445 
(Object Present vs. Object Absent) as within-subjects factor and Study (1 vs. 446 
2) as between-subjects factors. There was a significant main effect of 447 
Condition (F(1,28) = 7.97, p = .01, partial η2 = .22), due to higher activation in 448 
the Object Present (M = 0.07 µV, SE = .03 µV), than in Object Absent 449 
condition (M = -0.09 µV, SE = .04 µV), and no main effect of Study (for 450 




The results of Study 2 are consistent with the proposal that infants 455 
ascribe object representations to others not only when they attribute true 456 
beliefs, but also when they can attribute false beliefs to them. Similarly to 457 
Study 1, belief attribution here was based on visual perspective taking (infants 458 
had to encode that the object was not visible to the person). Crucially, in the 459 
False Belief segment, when the object disintegrated and this was visible to the 460 
infant but not to the person, there was increased gamma-band activation, 461 
similarly to the occlusion events (occlusion from the infant or from the person).  462 
 463 
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These results suggest that infants encode that the other person 464 
continues to represent the object, despite evidence that prompts them to 465 
discard their own representation of the very same object. Since disintegration 466 
has been previously shown not to trigger sustained object representation (16), 467 
higher gamma activation during this event reflects that the infants sustained 468 
the object representation they had attributed to the actor (who falsely believed 469 
the object to be behind the occluder), even though this representation was in 470 
sharp conflict with the infants’ own perception (as the object disintegrated). 471 
Thus, the infants must have encoded that the other person had seen the 472 
object being occluded, but did not see the disintegration, and hence the 473 
attributed object representation could not be discarded on her behalf, but had 474 
to be possibly refreshed and sustained further. 475 
 476 
We see no obvious ways to explain the activation patterns we 477 
observed in Study 1 and 2 in terms of simpler cognitive mechanisms that do 478 
not involve belief attributions. First, activation during occlusion from the actor 479 
only (Occlusion from Actor segments in both studies) could not be due to 480 
infants’ own sustained representation, since they continued to see the object 481 
during this event. Second, our results cannot be attributed to perceptual 482 
differences between the conditions (e.g., that the object was present in one 483 
condition but not in the other), since we subtracted the corresponding 484 
baseline activation from our data where this difference already existed, hence 485 
any activation difference due to this factor would have been thus subtracted 486 
from the time window of interest. Furthermore, results from the Occlusion from 487 
Actor segment in Study 2 excluded the possibility that the gamma-band 488 
activation in the Occlusion from Actor segment was due to infants’ expectation 489 
20 
of occlusion from their own perspective, as no such occlusion followed. 490 
 491 
Additionally, results from Study 2 confirm the late burst activation we 492 
found in Study 1. This additional burst of activation therefore was present in 493 
both studies towards the end of the Occlusion from Actor segment. During this 494 
period that followed after the occlusion of the object from the actor, nothing 495 
was happening in the video. Therefore this activation likely reflects 496 
computational processes that involve further processing of the earlier 497 
observed events, possibly related to keeping in mind the object representation 498 
attributed to the actor. 499 
  500 
 501 
 General Discussion 502 
 503 
The goal of the present paper was to investigate whether young infants 504 
ascribe representations to others during tracking of what this other person 505 
sees, knows or believes, through utilizing their own representational system 506 
that is otherwise used for encoding objects and events in the world. In Study 1 507 
we presented infants with scenes depicting a simple situation involving an 508 
object and actor, and events where the infant’s or the other person’s 509 
perceptual access to the object changed dynamically. In Study 2 we 510 
constructed a case where this event could lead to a false belief about the 511 
presence of the object in the other person. We recorded event-related 512 
oscillatory activity during the observation of these events. 513 
 514 
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Earlier studies (16, 17) found gamma-band oscillatory activity in infants 515 
for sustained object representation. We found similar gamma-band activations 516 
when an object became occluded from the infants’ own (Study 1, Occlusion 517 
from Infant) or someone else’s perspective (Study 1 & 2, Occlusion from 518 
Actor), consistent with the possibility that there are shared underlying 519 
mechanisms for sustained object representations for the self and for the ones 520 
attributed to another person. Crucially, the activation found in response to 521 
object occlusion from the other person’s perspective could only be explained 522 
by the enrolment of an object representation ascribed to her. This is 523 
supported by the fact that during this interval infants continued to perceive the 524 
object and therefore did not need to sustain the representation for them. 525 
Importantly, the same activation was observed in a false belief situation 526 
where, after being occluded from the actor, the infant saw the object 527 
disintegrating (Study 2, False Belief segment). Due to disintegration the object 528 
ceased to exist from the infant’s point of view, therefore EEG activation during 529 
this event is likely due to a sustained object representation on behalf of the 530 
actor. Together, the activations we found are indicative of the on-line 531 
processing of a representation that infants attribute to another person – a 532 
metarepresentation - based on her earlier perceptual access.  533 
 534 
While here we investigated one kind of belief content (beliefs about the 535 
presence of objects), based on an approach arguing for shared mechanisms 536 
for infants’ own representations and for attributed belief representations other 537 
kinds of belief contents should also activate the corresponding cognitive 538 
systems in the observer’s mind and be involved in operations on the ascribed 539 
belief representations. Recent evidence suggests that adults show an 540 
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increased N400 effect when they can infer that another person will have 541 
difficulties to integrate a sentence due to a semantically incongruous word 542 
(semantic violation) while they don’t perceive it as semantic violation, similarly 543 
to the cases when only they themselves perceive a semantic violation (18). 544 
 545 
These findings raise the question how infant’s primary representations 546 
would be separated from the representations ascribed to others While the 547 
present study does not directly address this question, we observed an 548 
additional burst of activation that accompanied only processing the object 549 
occlusion from the actor’s perspective, in both studies. The fact that similar 550 
activation did not occur during the Occlusion from the Infant events suggests 551 
that it might reflect some further processing of ascribed representations, and 552 
could potentially play a role in distinguishing an ascribed representation from 553 
the infants’ own reality representation. 554 
 555 
The finding that the cognitive systems that are otherwise dedicated for 556 
representing objects are also involved in mentalizing processes points to the 557 
possibility that infants recruit cognitive systems from outside of a 558 
hypothesised ToM-network (19) or ToM module (20) when representing 559 
others’ beliefs. Yet, we do not take such data to speak to the question that 560 
has repeatedly emerged with regard to ToM capacities, namely, whether such 561 
reasoning is predominantly subserved by domain-general or domain-specific 562 
processes (21). The gamma activations found in the ‘Occlusion from Actor’ 563 
events most likely signal sustaining an attributed representation of an object. 564 
This process relates to the encoding of the content of the actor’s belief, in 565 
other terms to the formation of a metarepresentation of this belief content. 566 
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However, as this is likely one of the first steps in the process of belief 567 
ascription (22), our findings leave open the possibility that in the further steps 568 
of belief processing such representations would serve as input to more 569 
specialized mindreading processes.  570 
 571 
Metarepresentations involving mental states were argued to differ from 572 
other kinds of metarepresentations, for instance from those of public 573 
representations (such as utterances) or abstract representations, and there 574 
could be separate metarepresentational competencies for each, as a distinct 575 
evolved adaptation (13). In line with this, behavioural evidence suggests that 576 
adults process belief representations distinctly from other meta-577 
representations that are not representations of mental states (such as 578 
vignettes describing an event) (23).  579 
 580 
Together, our studies demonstrate that preverbal infants engage in 581 
encoding the visual perspective and the false belief of others. By possessing 582 
such powerful representational capacities infants are endowed with the ability 583 
to ascribe to others any representations they themselves can form, including 584 
representations that are in conflict with their own representation of reality. One 585 
might wonder whether these capacities are innate or are subject to change 586 
during development. While this is a question for future studies, it is possible 587 
that some basic ToM mechanisms have an innate basis, although they likely 588 
require some critical social experience. 589 
 590 
Representing beliefs through forming metarepresentations of ascribed 591 
representations seems possible before the onset of language. The fact that 592 
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language might not be necessary to form metarepresentations in belief 593 
reasoning raises the possibility that similar cognitive processes could be 594 
present in non-human animals. By the logic that cognitive systems 595 
responsible to represent the physical world might be “re-used” to represent 596 
others’ mental state contents, the question emerges whether non-human 597 
animals could in some situations metarepresent their conspecifics’ 598 
representations. However, in the absence of empirical evidence this question 599 
remains a task for future research. 600 
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Figure legends 704 
 705 
Figure 1. Schematic illustrations of the events in Study 1. The first 1.5 706 
seconds of each video were identical in the two conditions (A). In the Object 707 
Present – Occlusion condition the object remained present, and was occluded 708 
by the rotating box, first from the actor’s point of view, then from the infant as 709 
well (B). In the Object Absent – Occlusion condition the rotation of the box 710 
was identical but occluded an empty area from the actor’s and then the 711 
infant’s side (C). In both conditions the trial ended with the box completely 712 
turned away. 713 
 714 
Figure 2. Time-frequency difference plots depicting average gamma-band 715 
oscillatory activation over the left and right posterior temporal cortex during 716 
the two segments in Study 1. Plots reflect mean activation difference between 717 
conditions; positive difference indicates higher activation in Object Present - 718 
Occlusion condition than in Object Absent - Occlusion condition. In both 719 
segments, 0 ms marks the onset of the occlusion event; in the first segment 720 
(A) from the Actor, in the second segment (B) from the Infant. Red rectangles 721 
indicate the time and frequency range over which statistics were computed. 722 
 723 
Figure 3. Mean activation in (A) Study 1 during Occlusion from Actor and 724 
Occlusion from Infant, and (B) Study 2 Occlusion from Actor at the target time 725 
windows (550-650 ms), at five left (L) and five right (R) temporal electrodes, 726 
over the 25-35 Hz frequency range. Error bars represent standard errors.    727 
 728 
30 
Figure 4. Time-frequency analysis of the average EEG during the False Belief 729 
event at ten electrodes over the left and right temporal cortex in Study 2. The 730 
plot reflects mean activation difference between conditions; positive difference 731 
indicates higher activation in Object Occluded – False Belief condition than in 732 
Object Absent – True Belief. 1200 ms is the onset of the disintegration event 733 
and 1800 is the offset. Red rectangle indicates the time and frequency range 734 
over which statistics were computed. 735 
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